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1LIMOS, Université Clermont Auvergne,
firstname.lastname@udamail.fr
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Abstract
At the main cryptography conference CRYPTO in 1989, Quisquater et
al. published a paper showing how to explain the complex notion of zero-
knowledge proof in a simpler way that children can understand. In the same
line of work, we present simple and intuitive explanations of various modern
security concepts and technologies, including symmetric encryption, public
key encryption, homomorphic encryption, intruder models (CPA, CCA1,
CCA2) and security properties (OW, IND, NM). The explanations given in
this paper may also serve in demystifying such complex security notions for
non-expert adults.
∗This work was partially supported by Digital trust Chair from the University of Auvergne
Foundation.
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1 Motivation and Contributions
All the technical concepts and notions explained in this paper are well-known to
cryptographers, and occur in most introductory courses for modern cryptography.
The goal of this paper is to propose explanations and illustrations that can be used
to explain these main modern security notions in a simple and understandable
manner to non-experts of all sorts: children, students, adults without background
in mathematics or computer science, and so on.
The paper is the result of more than ten years of teaching security courses at
different levels from primary school to master courses at university. Over time, a
set of helpful illustrations and examples for the various concepts have emerged,
as well as a certain structure in the presentation. The paper follows this struc-
ture: We start with our illustrations for symmetric encryption and asymmetric or
public key encryption (PKE). Then we give our illustrations of the different se-
curity levels that cryptographic systems can achieve, starting with the different
intruders (CPA, CCA1 and CCA2), and followed by the different security proper-
ties One-Wayness (OW), Indistinguishability (IND), Non-Malleability (NM) and
Key Anonymity (KA). We finish by giving intuitions for Homomorphic Encryp-
tion (HE), cryptographic hash functions, signatures and the Diffie-Hellman key
exchange.
Related Work: There is an international effort on the dissemination of com-
puter science1, in particular towards children. For instance, the authors of the
Computer Science Unplugged group have elaborated several activities present-
ing various concepts of computer science. Among them, they provide several
cryptographic activities like for instance the Peruvian Coin Flip, originally pro-
posed in [Fellows and Koblitz, 1993], where people who do not trust each other
and cannot see each other are able to agree on the outcome of a random coin
flip. They also propose a Kid Krypto public key encryption scheme that al-
lows children to encrypt and decrypt messages without having to share a se-
cret key, using a graph. Another activity, called Sharing Secrets and also in-
troduced in [Fellows and Koblitz, 1993], shows how to share personal informa-
tion accurately without having to give up any privacy at all. In addition, the
“Scout Patrol” activity presents a symmetric key encryption originally presented
in [Fellows and Koblitz, 1993]. In the ”CryptoClub”2 after-school program, middle-
grade students explore cryptography while applying mathematics to make and
break secret codes. This program is supported by the University of Illinois at
Chicago. Since 2010, the National Security Agency (NSA) also has its own pro-
1http://csunplugged.org
2http://www.cryptoclub.org/
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gram for kids3. There are several other websites4 that offer secret messages to
challenge kids. Purdue University5 proposes a web page that collects several re-
sources for explaining cryptology to kids. Currently, the cryptographer Jacques
Stern oversees a French nation-wide cryptanalysis competition for kids called
Alkindi6, which is the name of a famous Arabic mathematician that did the oldest
known cryptanalysis.
Our work follows lines of Quisquater et al. [Quisquater et al., 1989] where the
authors explain the concept of zero knowledge proofs. They use “the strange cave
of Ali Baba” as an illustration. This circular cave has a door protected by a secret
code. They show how, without revealing her code, Peggy the prover, can con-
vince Victor, the verifier, that she knows the code. In [Beaver, 2009], the author
proposes to introduce zero knowledge proofs in a classroom of undergraduate
students setting using the cave example and also to study the Fiat-Shamir pro-
tocol [Fiat and Shamir, 1987]. However the activity he proposes requires some
advanced mathematical notions. In [Gradwohl et al., 2007] a simple sudoku zero
knowledge proof using card games is presented. In [Bultel et al., 2016], using
cards and envelopes, four physical interactive zero knowledge proofs are proposed
for four Japanese logic games: Akari, Kakuro, KenKen and Takuzu.
In [Bell et al., 2003] the authors propose to explain digital signatures, digi-
tal cash, on-line poker and secure voting to school children. In [Borovik, 2002],
the author gives an implementation of activities proposed in Kid Krypto. More
recently in his blog [Green, 2014], M. Green proposes an understandable ex-
plaination of the zero-knowledge concept. In [Moran and Naor, 2010], the authors
use sealed envelopes, locked boxes and scratch cards to construct secure oblivi-
ous transfer, bit-commitment and coin flipping. In [Fellows and Koblitz, 1994]
and [Koblitz, 1997], the authors use several combinatorial objects to explain cryp-
tographic notions to children (and non-expert adults). Using high school mathe-
matics and more complex mathematical notions, they present one-way functions,
hash functions, signatures, public key cryptography (thanks to the “Peruvian coin
flip” activity and to a cryptosystem based on a graph similar to Kid Krypto).
In [Naor et al., 1999], Naor et al. explain to kids how to convince people that
you know “where is Waldo” without revealing any information about his po-
sition. These activities use simple material that kids can manipulate and help
them to understand the challenges behind the construction of a secure primitive.
In [Caballero-Gil and Bruno-Castaeda, 2007], the authors propose for secondary
school activities to teach mathematics through cryptography. They present the
3https://www.nsa.gov/kids
4http://www.thunk.com
5http://www.cerias.purdue.edu/education/k-12/teaching_
resources/lessons_presentations/cryptology.html
6http://www.concours-alkindi.fr/
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Vigenère cipher to introduce the notion of functions, a knapsack cipher to intro-
duce vectors, and to present randomness, proofs and equations. They use obliv-
ious transfer, zero knowledge protocols, and the Shamir secret sharing threshold
scheme. In [Phan, 2005], an attempt to explain block cipher cryptanalysis to kids
is presented. In [Forišek and Steinová, 2012], some metaphors and analogies for
teaching some computer science algorithms are proposed. As it has been shown by
A. Finkel in [Arnoux and Finkel, 2010], proposing mental representations helps
students to learn abstract notions. One of our aims is to propose mental repre-
sentations to help people understand modern security notions. Another goal is to
enable children to understand how security works and to show them that mathe-
matics is used to realize “fancy” modern technology. This paper also shows that
security is not easy to obtain.
Outline: In Section 2, we present our illustrations for the two main notions of
encryption: symmetric and asymmetric encryption. Then, in Section 3, we explain
our analogies for the security notions used for encryption schemes. We give our
illustrations for homomorphic encryption in Section 4, followed by cryptographic
hash functions in Section 5, signatures in Section 6 and the Diffie-Hellman key
exchange in Section 7. In Section 8, we conclude our paper and present some
perspectives.
2 Illustrating symmetric and asymmetric encryption
All encryption schemes invented before the Second World War are symmetric en-
cryptions, which means that a secret key is shared between two persons, and this
key is required to both encrypt and decrypt a message. Using advanced mathe-
matics, R. Rivest, A. Shamir and L. Adelman were able to propose the first asym-
metric or public key encryption scheme [Rivest et al., 1978b]. In this case, the
encryption and decryption stages are not symmetric, and do not use the same key.
The encryption key is public, and can be used by anybody, whereas the decryption
key is secret, known only to the recipient of the encrypted messages. This concep-
tual revolution allows anybody to use the public key of Alice to send encrypted
data to her, that only she is able to decrypt using her private key.
2.1 Symmetric Key Encryption Schemes
To illustrate symmetric key encryption, we use the following analogy based on a
lockable chest and keys as shown in Figure 1.
Illustration 1 (Symmetric Encryption). If Alice and Bob have the same key that
opens the chest, then they can exchange secret letters. Alice puts her secret letter,
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called a plaintext, in the chest and closes it with her key. This is called a cipher.
Then she sends it to Bob. Since Bob has the same key as Alice, he can open the
chest and get the letter. This is the principle of symmetric encryption: a symmetric
encryption uses the same key to encrypt and to decrypt a message. This key is
called a symmetric key.
encryption decryption
Figure 1: Symmetric encryption.
To illustrate how padlocks and keys can be constructed in the digital world of
computers, a simple example we often use is the Caesar Cipher, where each letter
is shifted three letters to the right in the alphabet. In this case the symmetric key
used is 3, and the set of possible keys is {1, . . . , 25}.
The Caesar cipher can also be used to illustrate weaknesses and attacks, as
a build-up towards the security definitions explained below: often students see
directly that such encryption scheme can be broken by testing all possible shifts,
which consists in trying only 25 possibilities. This introduces the notion of brute-
force attacks, and illustrates the necessity for a large key space. Since here there
are only 25 possibilities, the exhaustive search always succeeds.
Sometimes they also notice that, in English or any other language, some let-
ters are more frequently used than others. Then, by counting the most frequent
letters in the ciphertext, provided that it is long enough, it is possible to reduce the
number of possibilities to try (the so-called frequency analysis).
To show that not all encryption schemes are vulnerable to attacks such as fre-
quency analysis, a useful example is the One Time Pad Encryption (OTP) (also
known as Vernam encryption because it is generally credited to Gilbert S. Ver-
nam and Joseph O. Mauborgne in 1917, but it has been shown in [Bellovin, 2011]
that it was actually invented 35 years earlier by Frank Miller). This encryption
scheme is perfectly secure, i.e., according to Shanon’s information theory, with-
out knowing the key no information about the message is leaked [Vaudenay, 2005,
Baigneres et al., 2010]. In this scheme, the encryption of the binary message m
with the binary key k is m ⊕ k, where ⊕ is the exclusive-or operator (in other
words a bit-wise addition modulo 2), which means that the size of the key k is the
same as the size of the message m, which requires to have a large shared secret.
For instance, if the message m = 010111 is encrypted with the key k = 10010,
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then the ciphertext is c = 100101 = m ⊕ k. The decryption consists in comput-
ing c ⊕ k = m using the same key k. To allow kids to encrypt messages using
this scheme, it is possible to use the OTP principle with normal letters from the
alphabet and an addition modulo 26 instead of a binary representation.
Moreover, key re-usage can have dramatic consequences on the security of
the communication, as the following 3-pass Shamir protocol illustrates. It aims at
exchanging a secret message m without sharing a key beforehand. Formally the
protocol is composed of three messages, where {m}kA denotes the encryption of
m with the secret key kA of Alice:
1. A→ B : {m}kA
2. B→ A : {{m}kA}kB
3. A→ B : {m}kB
Note that this protocol works only if the encryption has the following algebraic
property, called key commutativity: {{m}kA}kB = {{m}kB}kA .
Figure 2: 3-pass Shamir protocol.
Illustration 2. With kids, this protocol can be realized using a real box (with two
places for padlocks), two padlocks, and regular mail, as described in Figure 2
and first proposed in [Shamir et al., 1981]. The kids have to find a secure way for
Alice to exchange a secret message with Bob, without sharing a key. The solution
consists in the following protocol: Alice puts her padlock on a box containing the
secret message and sends it to Bob. Then Bob adds his own padlock on the box
and sends it back to Alice. Now Alice removes her padlock and sends to Bob the
box that only has the Bob padlock. Finally Bob removes his padlock and opens
the box to discover the secret message.
This simple protocol can be used to illustrate protocol attacks, as there is for
example a reflection attack. Suppose an intruder intercepts the first message and
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simply sends it back to Alice. Then Alice removes her key and sends the plaintext
message m to the intruder. This is due to the lack of authentication in this proto-
col. It is also possible to mount a man-in-the middle attack, where that intruder
first plays a full session with Alice and learns the message m. Then he does a
second full session with Bob to let him know the message m. In that case Bob
could believe that only he and Alice know m, but the intruder also knows it.
Using OTP with this protocol can be used to create an interesting exercise. For
this, we need to consider the four algebraic properties of the exclusive-or operator:
(x⊕y)⊕z = x⊕(y⊕z) (Associativity), x⊕y = y⊕z (Commutativity), x⊕0 = x
(Unit element), and x ⊕ x = 0 (Nilpotency). The goal of the exercise is to ask
the students to discover the message m just by listening to the three messages
of the protocol. Note that the One Time Pad (OTP) encryption is commutative
since: {{m}kA}kB = (m ⊕ kA) ⊕ kB = (m ⊕ kB) ⊕ kA = {{m}kB}kA and
could thus be used here. To help them, it is possible to recall that the intruder
collects the following three messages during the execution of the protocol: m⊕kA;
(m⊕ kA)⊕ kB; m⊕ kB. Then they might discover that the intruder can learn m
just by performing the exclusive-or of these three messages, since m = m⊕ kA⊕
(m ⊕ kA) ⊕ kB ⊕m ⊕ kB. The box analogy reflects the fact that the encryption
is secure and key commutative, however this analogy does not take into account
some algebraic properties of the encryption scheme that might lead to some even
simpler attacks.
2.2 Public Key Encryption Schemes
We first explain the notion of Public Key Encryption (PKE), then we discuss how
to present the RSA and ElGamal encryption schemes as examples.
Illustration 3 (Public-Key Encryption). The principle of a public key encryption
scheme is that everyone can get the encryption key of somebody. These keys are
often published on web page of their owner and/or stored in some public key stor-
age like for instance the MIT PGP Public Key Server7. These encryption keys
can be seen as open padlocks that are distributed without the associated keys, as
shown in Figure 3, and proposed in [Beutelspacher, 1994]. Using these padlocks,
called public keys, everyone can encrypt a message but only the owner of the
corresponding decryption key (so-called secret key) can open the padlock and re-
cover the plaintext. The public key encryption schemes are also called asymmetric
encryption schemes by opposition to the symmetric encryption schemes since they
use a public key for encryption and a secret key for decryption.
The notion of trapdoor one-way function is the main concept of public key
cryptosytems. A one-way function is a function that is easy to compute but which
7https://pgp.mit.edu/
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decryption
Figure 3: Asymmetric encryption scheme
inverse is computationally hard to compute. To illustrate the notion of one-way
function one can use a phone book. In this situation, it is easy to find the phone
number knowing the name of a person, but it is quite difficult to recover the name
of the owner of a phone number knowing only this information8 . A trapdoor
one-way function is a one-way function such that knowing some additional infor-
mation, the trapdoor, the inverse becomes easy to compute. The trapdoor for the
phone book example could be a reverse phone directory, which is easy to com-
pile for the person who created the original directory. In public key cryptography
the trapdoor corresponds to the secret key which is difficult to find, given only
the public information. This secret key allows his owner to decrypt encrypted
messages computed using the public encryption function.
The concept of public-key encryption schemes can be illustrated both using
the RSA and ElGamal schemes.
Kid Krypto Encryption Scheme. Most real life public key encryption systems
use somehow sophisiticated mathematics that are not suitable for kids before high
school. The Kid Krypto activity uses only elementary school mathematics and
was proposed in [Fellows and Koblitz, 1993] and used by the Computer Science
Unplugged group9. Despite its security flaw, it can be used in the classroom.
It relies on the difficult (i.e. NP-complete) graph problem called Minimum
Dominating Set. A dominating set of a simple graph is a subset of vertices such
that any vertex of the graph is either in the subset or adjacent to a vertex in the
subset, as it shown in Figure 4. Since the set of all vertices is obviously a dom-
inating set, the question is to find a dominating set containing as few vertices as
possible.
As a first step, students have to be convinced that it is actually difficult to
find a minimum dominating set on a graph by working out several examples. The
8The phone book example is generally attributed to Silvio Micali [Khovanova, 2010] and Arto
Salomaa [Bauer, 1997].
9http://csunplugged.org
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Figure 4: Dominating Set
Figure 5: Keys
authors present a method to build such puzzles, as it shown in Figure 5: draw some
vertices. This set of vertices is the minimum dominating set. To each of them, add
some dominated vertices, forming disconnected star graphs. Finally, hide your
connected components by adding some edges between dominated vertices.
Let us now explain how to encrypt and decrypt a number using this graph as a
public key, as it shown in Figure 6. Note that this does not work for every graph
with a minimum dominating set, but only for ”Perfect Code” graph as defined by
Fellows and Koblitz in [Fellows and Koblitz, 1993]. The private key is the mini-
mum dominating set. Encrypting a number is done in two steps. First, the number
is randomly decomposed into a sum of numbers and spread over the vertices of
the graph, so that the values of all vertices add up to the initial value. Then, the
9
Figure 6: Encryption and Decryption
value of every vertex is replaced by the sum of its original value plus that of all
its neighbours. The cipher is the resulting graph, with the obtained values on the
vertices. Decrypting the message consists in adding the values of the dominating
vertices forming the secret key.
If encrypting and decrypting might be somehow tedious, however this activity
requires only few mathematical skills. Finally, note that this scheme is not actually
secure, because the encrypting step can be described using linear equations, that
are easily (i.e. polynomially) solved, using for instance Gaussian elimination.
RSA Encryption Scheme. In 1978, Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adle-
man [Rivest et al., 1978b] designed the first public key encryption scheme called
RSA for Rivest, Shamir, Adelman. Their encryption scheme relies on the com-
putationally hard problem of factorization: given n, the product of two primes
numbers p and q, we do not know up to now any efficient algorithm to recover
p and q, whereas it is easy to compute n from p and q. The public key is com-
posed of e and n, where e is an integer that is coprime to (p − 1) · (q − 1) and
n is the product of the two primes p and q. The secret key is d, the inverse of e
modulo (p − 1) · (q − 1). The encryption of the message m is me mod n and
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the decryption of the ciphertext c is cd mod n. The correctness of this encryption
scheme relies on the little Fermat’s theorem. Although the underlying theory is
complex, children can easily execute the encryption and decryption using small
numbers and pocket calculators or even online resources like Sage10 or Wolfram
Alpha11, as there are only simple operations such as multiplication, exponentia-
tion and modulo. Moreover one can convince them that factorization is difficult
for large numbers by giving an example of a large number and asking them to find
the factors.
Moreover, RSA can be used to illustrate the difference between deterministic
and randomized encryptions. It is easy to see that RSA is deterministic, which
means that the encryption of a messagemwith a given public key always produces
the same ciphertext. To illustrate that this can be a problem, one can sketch a very
simple voting protocol where voters encrypt either “yes” or “no” using the public
key of a voting authority: if the encryption is deterministic, it is easy to find out
how each voter voted by simply encrypting “yes” and “no” and comparing the
result to the voter’s submissions.
ElGamal Encryption Scheme. This encryption scheme was invented by T. El-
Gamal in 1985 [ElGamal, 1985]. It is a randomized encryption, which means that
each encryption of a given messagem, using a given public key, produces a differ-
ent ciphertext. This encryption scheme relies on the hard problem called discrete
logarithm: knowing g, ga mod p and p it is difficult to find a but it is easy from
g, a and p to compute ga mod p. The public key is composed of g, p and h such
that p is prime, and h = ga mod p. The secret key is a. The encryption of a mes-
sage m is the couple (gr mod p, hr · m mod p), where r is a random number.
The decryption of a ciphertext c = (c1, c2) consists in computing c2/ca1 mod p.
ElGamal has the advantage of relying on relatively simple math, so that for
example high school students can verify the correctness of the decryption.
Moreover, it is easy to see for non-experts that in RSA and Elgamal encryption
schemes, the security level depends on the length of the key: one can for example
ask them to factorize a small number, and use this to break RSA by decrypting a
message without using the secret key. Note that there are several other public key
encryption schemes that have been proposed, based on different techniques and
different computationally hard problems [Schneier, 1996].
10http://www.sagemath.org
11https://www.wolframalpha.com/
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3 Introducing Encryption Secheme Security Levels
At this point, the children have some intuition on how different schemes work
and know some classical attacks. Moreover they have seen that some schemes
might be secure in some contexts but insecure in others, and that the choice of
parameters is important. This allows us to motivate the necessity for precise secu-
rity definitions to evaluate the security level of encryption schemes. For this, one
has to define the intruders abilities and the security properties. We start by pre-
senting the various intruders and then the different properties. Many relationships
between these notions have been established in [Bellare et al., 1998]. Moreover
similar results exist for symmetric encryption schemes [Bellare et al., 1997].
3.1 Illustrating Intruders
We now present the main intruders against which encryption schemes should try
to resist. We start with a basic intruder and then increase its capabilities up to a
powerfull intruder.
3.1.1 Basic Attacker (BA)
Illustration 4 (Basic Attacker (BA)). Such attacker that tries to recover the plain-
text given only a ciphertext (produced either by a symmetric or assymmetric en-
cryption scheme), called challenge. This is illustrated in Figure 7: on the right we
have the intruder, and the challenge is pictured as the locked box on the left.
Figure 7: Basic adversary.
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Figure 8: CPA adversary.
Having an encryption scheme that resists to such an intruder is the mini-
mum security expected from an encryption scheme. In 1984, M. Miccali and
S. Goldwasser proposed a more realistic intruder and considered a more power-
ful security model. In 2014, they received the Turing Prize for their work about
the notion of Chosen Plaintext Attacks defined in [Goldwasser and Micali, 1984].
Later on, even more powerful intruders were introduced [Naor and Yung, 1990,
Rackoff and Simon, 1993]. Our aim is to present these intruders in an intuitive
way. To illustrate the intruders the examples given in Section 3.2 can be used.
3.1.2 Chosen Plaintext Attack (CPA)
The idea is very simple: when studying the security of an encryption, knowing
several pairs of plaintexts and ciphertexts can help to break the encryption. A
famous example is how A. Turing and his team broke the ENIGMA machine
during the second World War.
Illustration 5 (Chosen Plaintext Attack (CPA)). This notion is illustrated in Fig-
ure 8 as follows. On the left, we have the intruder before receiving the challenge,
and on the right the intruder after receiving the challenge (as above, the chal-
lenged is pictured as the locked box). In the case of chosen plaintext attacks,
before and after receiving the challenge, he can encrypt some messages, pictured
as an open padlock inside a crystal ball. In cryptography, these “crystal balls”
that allow the adversary to access certain values or to perform certain operations
are called oracles.
Note that such an intruder is more powerful than an intruder that only knows
the challenge, i.e., only one ciphertext: in the example of the voting system using
13
Figure 9: CCA1 adversary.
RSA encryption given above the attacker could “break” the secrecy of the votes
by simply encrypting all possible votes. Thus having a cryptosystem that resists
to a CPA intruder is more secure than only resisting to the basic attacker that only
knows the challenge, and cannot encrypt values of his choice.
3.1.3 Non-Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack (CCA1)
Illustration 6 (Non-Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack (CCA1)). In 1990, M. Naor
and M. Yung [Naor and Yung, 1990] introduced an even more powerful attack
model, also known as the “Lunchtime Attack”. They consider a scenario where
an employee has secret keys on his computer, which he uses to receive encrypted
messages. Anyone having access to his computer is able to decrypt all previously
received messages, assuming that the computer stores the secret key. Now suppose
that the employee goes for lunch but forgets to lock his computer: an attacker can
access it during a limited period of time. In particular, he can open all previously
received encrypted messages, and decrypt other messages of his choice. After
lunchtime, the adversary locks the employee’s computer in order not to raise any
suspicion.
Then the adversary tries to decrypt the next message received by the employee.
In other words, the new adversary model consists in an adversary who can encrypt
messages and additionally has access to a decryption oracle, i.e., a functionality
that allows him to decrypt a ciphertext of his choice, multiple times before he
gets the challenge. This intruder is known as CCA1 for Non-Adaptive Chosen
Ciphertext Attack, and illustrated in Figure 9: the key inside the leftmost crys-
tal ball represents the possibility to decrypt, to which he only has access before
receiving the challenge.
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3.1.4 Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack (CCA2)
Illustration 7 (Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack (CCA2)). In 1993, C. Rackoff
and D. Simon [Rackoff and Simon, 1993] imagined an even more powerful ad-
versary. This adversary can encrypt messages, and has access to a decryption
oracle multiple times before and AFTER he gets the challenge, but of course
he cannot decrypt the challenge. This adversary is known as the Adaptive Chosen
Ciphertext Attack, or “CCA2” for short, and illustrated in Figure 10.
Figure 10: CCA2 adversary.
Formally modeling all these notions requires the use of Probabilistic Polyno-
mial Time Turing machines (PPTs) and security games that exceed the abilities of
our young target audience. However, as we showed it is possible to present the
different types of intruders and to describe the differences between them.
3.2 Security Notions
We now present some security notions that have been introduced simultaneously
with the adversary models presented before, where each security notion corre-
sponds to one of the adversaries explained above. For this purpose, we developed
a metaphor using different types of containers to model the security properties
of cryptographic primitives. In [Bellare et al., 1998], Bellare et al. formally es-
tablished the relationships between these security notions and the above intruder
types.
3.2.1 One-Wayness
Illustration 8 (One-Wayness (OW)).
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Figure 11: Representation of the One-Way property.
The first security notion is called One-Wayness (OW). For an adversary, given
a ciphertext, it should be difficult to recover the plaintext in a reasonable amount
of time without knowing the associated decryption key. We represent this kind of
encryption as a translucent plastic bag (it is not possible to read the message) that
is closed with a padlock (representing the one-way encryption) and contains the
secret message.
A one-way encryption scheme is secure against the basic attacker as his only
possibility is to directly try to decrypt the message, but it is not secure against
stronger adversaries as explained below.
3.2.2 Indistinguishability
An encryption scheme is said to have the Indistinguishability (IND) property if an
intruder that knows two different plaintext messages having the same size and a
challenge, which is the encryption of one of the two messages, cannot determine
which one is encrypted in the challenge. In [Goldwasser and Micali, 1984], the
authors introduced this notion.
Illustration 9 (Indistinguishability (IND)).
Figure 12: IND-CPA attack on OW encryption.
We start by showing that a one-way encryption primitive can leak some infor-
mation in some situations (see Figure 12). We have two messages: one is written
on a gray paper and the second one is written on a white paper. These two mes-
sages plus one challenge (the translucent plastic bag) that contains one of the two
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previous messages, are given to the adversary. Is it possible for the adversary to
determine which message has been encrypted in the challenge?12 Usually kids
have the intuition that since the bag is translucent it might be possible to deter-
mine the color of the message inside, if not to read the plaintext itself. Asking the
kids how to prevent such an attack, they naturally propose to put the message in
a black bag (see Figure 13). Continuing our metaphor, this image represents the
notion of indistinguishability.
Figure 13: Representation of indistinguishability property.
Some students are able to describe the following indistinguishability attack
with a CPA intruder on a one-way public-key encryption scheme: encrypt with
the public key one of the two messages and compare the result with the challenge,
if they are equal you know which one has been encrypted, otherwise it is the
other message that is inside the challenge. This attack is general and works for all
deterministic encryption schemes, like for instance RSA as noted above.
In Figure 14, we show the encryption of a padlock image using the symmetric
encryption AES, first using Electonic Code Book encryption mode, and in the
second image using Cipher Block Chaining encryption mode. The ECB mode is
only one-way while the CBC mode is IND-CPA. This example is often convincing
that the translucent bag is a good representation of the notion of OW.
3.2.3 Non-Malleability
An encryption scheme is said to have the Non-Malleability (NM) property if an
intruder that knows a ciphertext (the challenge) cannot construct other valid ci-
phertexts for which he knows a relation between the corresponding plaintexts and
the plaintext encrypted in the challenge.
Illustration 10 (Non-Malleability (NM)).
12As we have seen for the vote example with CPA adversary, an encryption that is used in a vote
system should have the indistinguishability property in order to avoid that an adversary determines
the vote of each voter.
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Figure 14: Encryption with a OW-CPA encryption and an IND-CPA secure en-
cryption.
Figure 15: Attack against IND-CCA2.
We illustrate his property by describing an attack on a scheme that does not
have the NM property. If we consider a CCA2 intruder, then the black plastic bag
is not safe. In order to help students to discover the corresponding attack, we
propose a situation where the message is written on a Rubik’s Cube and placed in
a black plastic bag.
If the students remember correctly the capabilities of a CCA2 intruder, they
are able to propose the following attack: turn the Rubik’s Cube to modify the
challenge and give the new ciphertext to the decryption oracle. The oracle de-
crypts the modified message and gives it back to the intruder i.e., the oracle opens
the bag. He just has to turn back the cube to recover the plaintext corresponding
to the challenge. In order to prevent such attack, a more secure encryption can be
represented as a rigid back box.
Such a rigid black box illustrates the notion of non-malleability. In other
words it is not possible for the intruder to modify the challenge to obtain a valid
ciphertext that has a pre-established relationship with the plaintext encrypted
in the challenge. This notion has been formally introduced by Dolev et al. in
2000 [Dolev et al., 2000].
18
Figure 16: Representation of Non-Malleability property.
3.2.4 Key Privacy
The previous security properties focus on the security of the messages, but in
2001, cryptographers also introduced a property concerning the security of the
key used in a cryptosystem [Bellare et al., 2001]. The idea is similar to the in-
distinguishability of the message, only that this time it concerns the key. The
adversary selects a message m, and a pair of public keys. The challenge is com-
posed of the message m encrypted with one of the two keys. The goal for the
intruder is to determine which key has been used.
Illustration 11 (Key Privacy).
Figure 17: Attack on Key Privacy property.
Using an ordinary padlock and looking at the shape of the key hole, one can
probably determine which key has been used. Note that the original message
is part of the challenge. Such an encryption scheme does not preserve the key
privacy. Figure 18 presents a digital padlock for which it is not possible to distin-
guish which digital key has been used to encrypt the challenge: such an encryption
has the key privacy property.
4 Explaining Homomorphic Encryption
In 2009, G. Gentry [Gentry, 2009] solved a long standing open problem intro-
duced by Rivest et al. [Rivest et al., 1978a] that asks for the capability to per-
form any operation on encrypted data without decrypting the data. Encryption
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Figure 18: Key Privacy property.
schemes with this property are extremely useful in the cloud applications. Before
2009, several partial solutions called partial homomorphic encryption schemes
have been proposed, like for instance [ElGamal, 1985, Naccache and Stern, 1998,
Paillier, 1999, Fousse et al., 2011, Goldwasser and Micali, 1984].
Illustration 12 (Homomorphic Encryption). G. Gentry presented the problem of
the homomorphic encryption in [Gentry, 2010] as follows: Alice has a raw dia-
mond and some gold. She wants a jeweler to make for her a nice ring, but she is
afraid that her precious stone is stolen by the jeweler. For this reason, she needs
to put the stone in a safe place. Since she also wants the jeweler to work on the
stone, she should ask him to use a secure glove box as presented in Figure 19.
Figure 19: Glove box.
In other words, the jeweler should be able to apply any function f on the
ciphertext (i.e., from outside the safe) and the effect of f appears on the plaintext
(inside the safe). More formally, the fully homomorphic property is the following,
where m1, . . .mp are messages, k the key and f the function applied outside the
encrypted messages and g the function applied inside the encrypted messages:
f({m1}k, . . . , {mp}k) = {g(m1, . . . ,mp)}k
Partial homomorphic encryption schemes only allow to perform one operation,
like for instance Elgamal [ElGamal, 1985] or RSA [Rivest et al., 1978b], and are a
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good first example. For instance for RSA, the product of two encrypted messages
c1 = m
e
1 mod n and c2 = m
e
2 mod n is equal to (m1 · m2)e mod n which is
the encryption of the product of the two plaintexts m1 and m2.
Moreover, there is a fully homomorphic encryption scheme which does not use
sophisticated mathematics: the DGHV encryption scheme [van Dijk et al., 2010].
It only uses modular multiplication and addition and works as follows. The secret
key is p, an odd number in [2η−1, 2η[, where η is the so-called security parameter,
which evaluates the security of the scheme. The plaintext is a bit m ∈ {0, 1} and
the encryption of m is given by:
c = q · p+ 2 · r +m
where q is a large random number (q ≈ η3) and r a small random number (r ≈
2
√
η), such that 2 · r ≥ p/2.
For decrypting the ciphertext c, knowing the secret key p, it suffices to perform
the two following modulo operations on c:
m = (c mod p) mod 2
This encryption scheme is somewhat13 fully homomorphic for addition and mul-
tiplication (verifying this is a feasible exercise for high school students), hence
for all boolean function f . The advantage of this symmetric encryption scheme is
that it is simple enough to allow us to explain how to store encrypted data in the
cloud. Note that it is possible to modify this scheme to encrypt messages longer
than one bit.
5 Explaining Cryptographic Hash Functions
Cryptographic hash functions are mathematical functions that take as input any
bitstring and output a digest of a fixed size, H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n. Their desired
properties are pre-image resistance, second-pre-image resistance and collision
resistance [Rogaway and Shrimpton, 2004], which are explained below. These
cryptographic primitives tend to be complex to design. Famous examples include
MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256 or SHA-3.
Illustration 13 (Cryptographic Hash Function). A cryptographic hash function
can been explain using the analogy of fingerprints for humans as shown in Fig-
ure 20. Kids can play with ink and fingers, and discover that any object (human)
can be reduced to a constant size representation, since each human can be char-
acterized by his fingerprints.
13Technically it is not fully homomorphic as errors build up over time unless we introduce a
bootstrapping.
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Figure 20: Representation of an hash function, as a deterministic procedure that
takes a human as input and produces his fingerprint as a digest.
Following this representation of hash functions, the desired properties for
cryptography can be illustrated as in Figure 21.
Pre-image Resistance: For the fingerprint, given a human, it is easy to obtain
his fingerprint, but from a fingerprint it is difficult to recover the corresponding
human. This property is close to the one-wayness property for encryption function.
More formally given a hash value h it should be difficult to compute a message m
such that h = hash(m).
In real life the police have a collection of identities and corresponding finger-
prints of most of the criminals. By comparing one fingerprint with this collection
it is then possible to identify a suspect. To the same goal, cryptographers have in-
vented the so called “rainbow table” that corresponds to an efficient data stucture
that contains the list of precomputed hash values of some messages.
Second Pre-image Resistance: The idea of this property is that given a human
it should be difficult to find another one that has the same fingerprint. More for-
mally, given a input message m it should be difficult to find a different input m′
such that hash(m) = hash(m′).
For instance, the hash function that gives the color of the eyes of a person is
pre-image resistant, but not second pre-image resistant, because it is not difficult
to find another person with the same color of the eye in the population, because
there is a small number of eye colors.
Collision Resistance: A collision pair is two different humans having the same
fingerprint. If it is difficult to find two different messages that have the same hash
value, then the hash function is called collision resistant. Fingerprints have this
property: even true twins do not have the same fingerprint, although they share
the same DNA.
Today hash functions are for example used to check the integrity of a received
message. For instance when a software S is downloaded from a server, and d
is the digest of this file, i.e., d = H(S), the user can check the integrity of the
received file S ′ by checking that d is equal to H(S ′). If somebody wanted to
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• Pre-image
• Second Pre-image
• Collision
Figure 21: Properties of hash functions.
modify the file by for example including a virus, he would need to find a second
pre-image for the given hash value. Moreover, in cryptography, hash functions are
also used to reduce the size of some data or to generate random values such as in
the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [Fiat and Shamir, 1987].
6 Illustrating (Blind) Signatures
Another important primitive in security is the ability to sign documents.
Illustration 14 (Signature). A signature attests that you are the author of the
document, i.e., the person who has generated it. In real life, this has been used
for ages: for instance kings, emperors and presidents all have unfalsifiable seals,
as shown in Figure 22. Beutelspacher [Beutelspacher, 1994] proposed a similar
illustration using an asymmetric bolt. These objects are assumed to be difficult to
copy, in other words it is difficult to forge a signature of somebody else.
Following the invention of public key encryption, researchers proposed var-
ious ways of signing electronic documents. The key principle is illustrated in
Figure 23: a secret signature key plays the role of a seal. Then, given a signed
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Figure 22: Seal
message, everyone can verify that the signature has been generated by the owner
of the secret key (the “seal”) using his public key.
signature
signature key verification key
verification
Figure 23: Signature
Using potatoes and ink, kids can make their own seal and “sign” messages
they exchange using envelopes. For high school students, one can present RSA
signatures [Rivest et al., 1978b] or Elgamal signatures [ElGamal, 1985].
RSA signatures [Rivest et al., 1978b] can also be used as blind signatures. The
idea of a blind signature is to be able to sign an encrypted message, and then
remove the encryption to obtain a signature on the plaintext message. This is for
example used in electronic elections: before voting, each voter asks the authority
to verify that they are registered, and to sign their encrypted (in order to preserve
the secret of the vote) ballot. Then the voter decrypts the message, and obtains a
ballot of his choice, signed by the authority. The voter uses this signed ballot to
vote during the election, where the signature proves that he is registered and has
the right to vote.
Illustration 15 (Blind Signature). As proposed in [Chaum, 1985], blind signa-
tures can be illustrated as in Figure 24: a voter sends an envelope (representing
the encryption) that contains his ballot and a sheet of carbon paper. Then the
authority signs the envelope on the outside, either using a pen or using his seal,
and the voter can open the envelope to obtain the signature on his initial ballot.
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Figure 24: Blind Signature.
This protocol can easily be realized with kids, one only needs some standard
office material.
7 Illustrating the Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key Exchange
with Colors
In 1976, W. Diffie and M. Hellman [Diffie and Hellman, 1976] proposed the first
protocol of key exchange. This protocol allows Alice and Bob to establish a shared
secret key using a so-called one-way function.
Like the ElGamal encryption, the Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange protocol
relies on the discrete logarithm problem and works as follows. Alice and Bob
know a public number g, where g is a public generator of a multiplicative cyclic
group. Alice picks a secret random number a and Bob picks a secret random
number b. Alice sends to Bob ga then Bob replies gb. Finally, Alice computes the
shared key (gb)a and Bob can also compute it as (ga)b.
Illustration 16 (Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange). The Diffie-Hellman protocol can
be illustrated using colors as follows14. The illustration, first proposed by Simon
Singh [Singh, 1999], relies on two properties of colors:
• It is easy to mix two colors, for instance mixing yellow and blue gives green.
• Given a color that was obtained by mixing two colors, it is difficult to “sep-
arate” the color and obtain the initial colors.
For the colored version of the Diffie-Hellman protocol we assume that the color
yellow • is a public color, known by everybody. We also assume that the secret
color of Alice is the color blue • and that the secret color of Bob is the color red
•. Alice and Bob want to agree on a new shared secret color. For this they follow
the protocol described in Figure 25, where the name of the white rabbit is Bob.
14The following videos show how this protocol works https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=U1kybvKaUeQ or https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3QnD2c4Xovk
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• •
• + • = •
• + • = •
• + • + • = •
Figure 25: Diffie-Hellman protocol with colors.
In the first step, Alice sends the color green • to Bob, which is the result of the
public color • mixed with her secret color •. Then Bob sends the color orange
• to Alice, which is the result of the public color • mixed with his secret color •.
Now they both know a common shared secret color brown • that is computed as
follows by Alice and Bob:
• Alice mixes the received orange color • with her secret blue color •.
• Bob mixes the received green color • with his secret red color •.
This protocol can be executed with kids using some transparent paper and
colored pens, or even with paint as it is shown in the video. Everyone selects his
own color and draws a circle on a transparent paper with their public color and
the secret color. Then they can exchange the transparent papers, then they just
have to use another secret transparent paper that only contains their secret color
to obtain the secret shared color. In practice this protocol might sometimes be
difficult to set up, in that case using a drawing software such as GIMP15 can be a
good alternative to convince the students.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we proposed child-friendly illustrations of basic modern security
concepts that are used in many of the secure electronic devices used by kids today.
In the spirit of previous work, we proposed illustrations and analogies that can be
used to explain complex security notions to children and non-experts.
As future work, we would like to find similar illustrations for more complex
notions like identity based encryption, broadcast encryption, proxy re-encryption
or even post-quantum cryptography like lattice based encryption.
15https://www.gimp.org/
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